Introduction
There is ample scientific evidence today that the global climate is changing and that dealing with the adverse effects of climate change will be one of the biggest challenges the world will have to face in the coming decades. As one commentator has noted, "to a large extent, the state of the environment today is the result of the technological choices of yesterday. The state of the environment in the 21st century will be determined largely by the technologies we choose today" (Trindade, 1991) . Thus, in our view it is inevitable that any multilateral response to climate change should address not only the need for sustainable development, but also the use of cleaner technologies. Given that less than 20 per cent of the countries in the world have been identified as industrialized nations under the Kyoto Protocol, the only multilateral agreement to date to deal with climate change, it is also crucial that the development and use of clean technologies are not limited only to this minority of countries. It is essential that the response to climate change must address the need for transfer of technology from industrialized countries to developing countries.
The importance of such technology transfer has been recognized by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, which came into force in 1994. In Article 4.1c it requires the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), "to promote and cooperate in the development, application, diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices, and processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases" (UN, 1992 The importance of technology transfer is also recognized in Agenda 21, a vision for the 21st Century based on the concept of sustainable development (UN, 1993) . Chapter 34 of the Agenda which deals with "Transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation, and capacity building" calls for access to scientific and technical information, promotion of technology transfer projects, promotion of indigenous and public domain technologies, capacity building, intellectual property rights, and long-term technological partnerships between suppliers and recipients of technology. Further, it points out that "technology cooperation involves joint efforts by enterprises and governments, both suppliers of technology and its recipients. Therefore, such cooperation entails an interactive process involving government, the private sector, and research and development facilities to ensure the best possible results from transfer of technology". Furthermore, it also recommends the utilization of existing technological information and promoting research partnerships and assessment networks and the development of new ones.
This paper looks at some of the key impediments faced by policymakers and other relevant stakeholders in connection with transfer of technology under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the three mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol to deal with mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs). This mechanism is of particular interest for the issue of technology transfer as it encourages the Non-Annex 1 countries which are not required under the Kyoto Protocol to meet mandatory GHG mitigation targets to participate in the global efforts to deal with climate change mitigation. This is done by encouraging these countries to host the development of projects in their jurisdictions by Annex 1 countries that are required to meet binding GHG mitigation targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Projects so developed are expected to be mutually beneficial by contributing to sustainable development activities of Non-Annex I countries and enabling Annex 1 countries to earn carbon credits towards meeting their binding mitigation targets under the Protocol. Further, this paper analyses the various legal and policy related consideration that might help both Annex 1 countries and non-Annex 1 countries to overcome the impediments faced in developing CDM projects and make the mechanism a win-win option for all stakeholders.
Technology Transfer and the Kyoto Protocol
Technology is a Greek word derived from the synthesis of two words: techne (meaning art) and logos (meaning logic or science). So loosely interpreted, technology means the art of logic or the art of scientific discipline (Carayannis et al., 2006) . According to Paap (1996) , technology can be defined as "the use of science-based knowledge to meet a need". Bigwood (2004) opined that this definition "perfectly describes the concept of technology as a bridge between science and new products".
The United Nation Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) draft International Code on the Transfer of Technology defines technology transfer as "transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods" (UNCTAD, 1985) .
The IPCC defines technology transfer as "a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research/education institutions" (IPCC, 2000) . This definition covers every relevant flow of hardware, software, information and knowledge between and within countries, from developed to developing countries and vice versa whether on purely commercial terms or on a preferential basis (Seres, 2008) .
The importance of technology transfer is recognized in the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, the only multilateral instrument to date to deal with the climate change related threats 1 . Under the UNFCC, both developed and developing countries have agreed to take measures to limit GHG emissions and promote adaptation to future climate change impacts; submit information on their national climate change programs and inventories; promote technology transfer; cooperate on scientific and technical research; and promote public awareness, education, and training. The Kyoto Protocol reiterates the need to provide "new and additional" financial resources to meet the "agreed full costs" incurred by developing countries in carrying out these commitments. In particular, the Kyoto Protocol provides inter alia that "…developed country Parties… shall: provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 of the convention…". Thus, transfer of technology is one of the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, although, it is not specifically included in the mandate of the CDM mechanism.
Transfer of technology from the developed countries to developing countries could play a very effective role in shaping the future world. However, one key impediment in such cross border technology transfer is that the bulk of technology transfers occur within the countries that generate them. According to Pachauri and Bhandari (1994) , the provision of a favorable environment for transfer of technology must be based on equity concerns and on participatory decision-making to improve the chances that such enabling environment will be sustainable. However, it could also be argued that technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries will be mostly the consequence of commercial transactions, and not through aid or grants (IPCC, 1999) . The key reason for this is the private ownership of intellectual property rights (IPRs) relating to technology and the obvious commercial interest of the owners to protect their rights and profit from them. The argument in favor of the commercial interest in intellectual property lies in the fact that bulk of the research and development efforts in intellectual property is financed by the private sector and the entities in the private sector are commercial organizations which profit from their innovations (Sipila, 1999) .
Thus, in order to facilitate the transfer of technologies from the countries and companies that develop them to other countries, effective and efficient legislative and regulatory frameworks that recognize the ownership of technology and prevent the abuse of IPRs are required. Based on their empirical analysis of the influence of the strength of IPRs on technology transfer to developing nations, Park and Lippoldt (2008) pointed out that "IPRs do not operate in a vacuum. There are complementary factors that help facilitate technology transfer, such as the quality of infrastructure, government policies and regulations, and market structure, and complementary factors that help facilitate innovation, such as the quality of research institutions and the extent of collaboration among different research organizations." One of the examples they provide based on the study is that stronger levels of patent protection are positively and significantly associated with the inflows of high-tech products, like pharmaceutical goods, chemicals, aerospace, computer services, information, and office and telecom equipment.
Kyoto Protocol and the CDM
Under the Kyoto Protocol, only a handful of industrialized countries (called Annex 1 countries in the protocol) have agreed to internationally binding targets and timetables for reducing GHGs, that too, for a limited period as the operative period of the protocol ends in 2012. In the developing world, countries such as India, China, and Brazil which are among the largest GHG emitting developing countries have always argued against the introduction of binding targets for developing countries, their main argument being that such reduction targets would slowdown economic growth in the developing countries. The result of the debate between Annex 1 countries (industrialized countries) and the non-Annex 1 countries (developing countries) on the responsibility of each state for the current state of global warming resulted in the common but differential responsibility of parties that is enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol.
CDM, the only mechanism out of the three introduced under the Kyoto Protocol that applies to non-Annex 1 countries, enables developing countries to participate in the global GHG mitigation efforts by allowing Annex 1 countries or their authorized private entities to invest in environmentally friendly projects in their jurisdictions, which would enable the Annex 1 countries to earn credits that could be applied towards meeting their GHG reduction targets whilst contributing to sustainable development of the developing countries (Kyoto Protocol, year (1)). For example, an investor from an Annex I country could invest in a project in a non-Annex 1 country to convert a coal-fired power plant into a project powered by natural gas. The advantage to the Annex 1 country is that it could obtain 'Certified Emissions Reductions' (CERs) representing the amount of GHG emissions that are avoided by the conversion of the plant as aforesaid. The CERs so earned could be then used by the Annex 1 country towards meeting its GHG mitigation targets. The non-Annex 1 country could gain from the project by inheriting the environmentally sustainable technology in which the Annex 1 country invests in converting the plant. In addition, depending on the manner in which such an investment project is negotiated and agreed, the non-Annex 1 country could benefit from sharing profits of any CERs sold in the carbon markets as well as by creation of new jobs and training of local talent to manage and sustain the project after development.
CDM and Technology Transfer
The CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, although under the Kyoto Protocol, the parties have agreed to promote technology transfer 2 . Further, it is not identified as a means of fulfilling the technology transfer objectives of the Protocol. However, since CDM allows industrialized countries which have accepted emissions reduction targets to develop or finance projects that reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex 1 countries in exchange for CERs, if the technology used in a CDM project is not available in the host country but must be imported, the project will lead, de facto, to a technology transfer.
The CDM glossary of terms does not define "technology transfer". For the purpose of CDM projects, technology transfer could be defined as the use of equipment and/or knowledge not previously available in the host country by the CDM project. The emission reductions that may result from CDM projects are certified on the basis of voluntary participation approved by each party involved; real, measurable and long-term climate benefits; and emissions reductions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project (Kyoto Protocol, year). Thus, although not within the mandate of the CDM mechanism, the development of CDM projects has the potential to involve transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries. In fact, in section A.4.3 of the CDM project design document, the project parties are requested to indicate the "technology to be employed by the project activity" (UNFCCC, 2006 (1)). Further, the project participants are requested to "include a description of how environmentally safe and sound technology and know-how to be used is transferred to the host Party" (UNFCC, 2006 (2)).
Theoretically, the CDM mechanism looks ideal to promote the "common but differential responsibility" of nations for global warming and the related need for global action to mitigate climate change that is enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol. However, in the real world, developing and benefitting from CDM projects would not be easy as explained in the next section.
Problems with Technology Transfer under CDM
Transfer of technology between countries is an area that has generated special interest in the areas of international as well as local policymaking and legislation. As a result, in addition to most countries having national policy frameworks and legislation dealing with transfer of technology, there are many agreements at the multilateral as well as regional and bilateral levels that operate and apply to transfer of technology across national borders. At the very core of these legal and policy frameworks and the multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements is the interest of protection of the rights of the technology owners against unfair and unauthorized use. Other interests include, enabling developing countries to benefit from technology transfer and the protection of the interests of the recipient countries.
As the CDM is expected to involve Annex 1 countries or approved parties from Annex 1 countries investing in non-Annex 1 countries, the transfer of technology under such projects could be considered international. The technology that will be transferred or is transferable within CDM projects may consist of "hardware" elements, such as machinery and equipment involved in the production process, and/or "software" elements, including knowledge, skills, and know-how. Haites et al. (2006) noted that there was evidence indicating that CDM promotes technology transfer. However, it has been widely discussed in the literature that barriers to technology transfer still exist. It is expected that by circumventing these barriers, the present CDM can be developed into an even more viable technology transfer platform in the future. This section explores some of the key difficulties concerning transfer of such technology that might adversely affect the development of CDM projects.
We note that there are widely-discussed problems with CDM, including the lengthy project approval process, low prices of CERs in the open market, limited sustainability value of the approved CDM projects and the limited number of projects with genuine technology transfer prospects. These aspects have been widely discussed in the literature Kua, 2009; Kua and Gunawansa, 2009; Ellis et al., 2007; Adhikari et al., 2008) . For example, Schneider et al (2008) provided evidence that CDM as a whole spurs technology transfer and cautioned that the results vary substantially with project size, geography and technology. Specifically, Kua (2009) proposed a concept to rate the sustainability value-add of CDM projects and provide financial incentives to encourage more CDM projects to contribute directly to sustainable development and Annex-1 countries to transfer technologies to those countries that presently do not have infrastructure or institutional facilities to attract CDM project investments. Ellis et al. (2007) articulated a need to stabilize the CER market structure so that a clear signal is sent to project investors on the valuation of emission reductions, preferably for periods longer than five years. Gunawansa (2009) recommended changes to the legislative and policy architecture relating to intellectual property and foreign direct investment in developing countries to facilitate technology transfer under CDM projects. Although these are all relevant points, in this paper, we have chosen to address only some key aspects of CDM that specifically relate to the debate of transfer technology which have not been dealt with in detail in the above literature. These concern the conflicts between CDM and international investment laws, concerns regarding protection of IPRs of the project developers, the capacity of developing countries to accept and benefit from technology transfer, the emergence of self-financing projects, and the ironic lack of interest in host countries.
Conflicts between CDM and International Investment Laws
Foreign direct investment (FDI) by investors from developed countries, in developing countries, is not a new phenomenon. Investors have been making cross border investments in projects for decades. Especially, after the Second World War capital mobility has grown under the control of the International Monitory Fund (IMF), the growth accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s after the revival of bank lending by the recycling of petrodollars in the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, and the introduction of floating exchange rates in major industrialized countries (Brenner, 1998 ).
However, it should be pointed out that although developing countries are no strangers to receiving and benefitting from FDI, the development of CDM projects in developing countries will not be an easy task. One of the reasons is the conflicts that could arise between the CDM and the international investment laws.
International investment law deals with the area of international law that applies to investments made in one or more jurisdictions by parties from beyond those jurisdictions. This area of law has its source both in customary international practices, that is law derived from the customary state practices (Rosenne, 1984) , and laws created by international treaties. The bulk of investment treaty law is contained in a multitude of bilateral, regional and multilateral investment treaties (UNCTAD, 1999) . In addition to these, various regional treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the South Asian Association of Regional Corporation (SAARC) have various provisions on protecting cross border investments between members, although the primary focus of such agreements might not be investment protection.
Fair and equitable treatment
One of the key principles developed by international investment agreements (IIAs) that would be inconsistent with the CDM is the non-discriminatory principle, that is, fair and equitable treatment of all countries. The meaning of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard may not necessarily be the same in all the treaties in which it appears. The proper interpretation may be influenced by the specific wording of a particular treaty, its context, negotiating history or other indications of the parties' intent. However, understanding its basic meaning is not difficult. What it means is that investors should be treated without discrimination on the basis of their nationality.
The key aim of the non-discriminatory principle is to increase investor certainty, promote confidence, and reduce risks to investors, by removing barriers and distortions to investments, thereby promoting foreign direct investment. In addition, they aim to address issues such as expropriation, compensation, and settlement of disputes for protecting investors from host governments' actions that could harm investor interests (Werksman et. al.; 2001) . The nondiscriminatory principle seem to be in contrary to the development of CDM projects because a fundamental principle of the Kyoto Protocol is the differential treatment of countries based on such factors as level of economic development and historical GHG emissions, which is very clearly elaborated in the UNFCCC (Werksman et. al.; 2001) .
For the investors who develop CDM projects in non-Annex 1 countries to be able to generate internationally marketable CERs, they will have to comply with the CDM rules. In particular, they will have to satisfy the three conditions specified in Article 5 of the Kyoto Protocol, that is, that the CDM project participation by the investor as well as the host country is voluntary; the project brings real, measurable and long-term climate benefits; and the emissions reductions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project. The projectspecific rules for CDM projects as described in the Marrakech Accords decided at COP 7 in November 2001, and subsequent decisions taken by the Executive Board, are summarized in the CDM implementation guide prepared by UNCTAD (2003) . If these conditions are not fulfilled, it would not be possible to develop a CDM project. Further, not every country can benefit from CDM projects. This is because the eligibility to host a CDM project is open only to developing countries that are considered as non-Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Further, participation by Annex 1 countries may also be conditional upon successfully implementing other international obligations called for under the Kyoto Protocol or the UNFCCC, such as national reporting obligations. Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol address reporting and review of information by Annex I Parties under the Protocol, as well as national systems and methodologies for the preparation of greenhouse gas inventories.. Thus, clearly, the principle of nondiscrimination is not in harmony with the CDM.
National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
Two other standards which also aim to ensure non-discrimination between countries are enshrined in various trade liberalization agreements, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) being a good example. First is the national treatment standard (Article 17 of GATS) which requires the host government to extend the same or better treatment to foreign investors and investments as they extend to domestic investors and investments. Second is the most favoured nation standard (Article 2 of GATS) which requires the host to treat all foreign investors equally, regardless of country of origin. Similar provisions could be found under the WTO General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). These principles have been designed to ensure inter alia that when it concerns international trade of goods and services, all sellers and service providers are equally treated (Werksman, 1999) .
Due to their very nature, CDM projects will entail services or service-related functions. Accordingly, one of the most important WTO agreements, insofar as the CDM is concerned, will be GATS. Under GATS, the MFN obligation requires every WTO member to give the services or service providers of any other member treatment no less favorable than that it accords the 'like' services or service providers of any other country. This provision prevents members from playing favorites between countries, so that any varying treatment accorded to service must be based upon qualities of the service itself rather than on its country of origin (Housman and Van Dyke (1995) . The national treatment obligation extends this non-discrimination principle to a country's treatment of foreign and domestic goods and services by requiring the country to extend to foreign goods and services and service providers' treatment no less favorable than it gives its own, similar goods, services and service providers.
Provided that a CDM host country is a WTO member, services, such as business and engineering services, will be covered by the GATS obligations of MFN and national treatment. The issue that arises here is whether based on the application of these rules; a host country could differentiate between CDM project service providers based on the status of the home country of the service provider under the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, the issue is whether project developers from countries that have not acceded to the Kyoto Protocol be sidelined by developing countries who are WTO members when inviting developers for CDM projects. Voigt (2009) pointed out that such exclusions by way of administrative action, laws, regulations, rules and procedure, may come into direct conflict with the aforesaid non-discriminatory principles enshrined in GATS.
Another issue is that the sale of CERs from CDM projects will not be considered as goods or a service under WTO (Wiser, 2002 Another point worth making is that in most developing countries, to date, facilities such as power and energy are controlled and supplied by state monopolies. These services are provided to the public at subsidized rates to make them affordable. Thus, some countries may be reluctant to allow investors from other countries to participate in developing CDM projects in such areas, even if such projects would be more energy efficient. Key reasons include the reluctance to loose control and the likely price increases if such utility services are developed and provided by profit oriented commercial entities (Gunawansa, 2000) . Further, countries could use the GATS monopoly exception to shut foreign developers out entirely, if they so desired (Wiser, 2002) . This is because GATS does not require members with domestic service monopolies to allow competition from foreign service suppliers.
Thus, the above inconsistencies between the CDM and the non-discriminatory principles of international investment laws may prevent some developing countries that are not considered to be Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol from benefitting from the CDM and transfer of technology from CDM projects. Further, the same conflict will prevent developed countries, which are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol but are interested to earn emission credits, from participating in CDM projects in developing countries and contributing to the sustainable development of those countries with technology transfer.
Conflicts between Existing National Investment Policies and CDM Goals
The current investment promotion and economic development policies in most developing countries are more focused on one aspect of sustainable development -economic sustainability. Thus, environmental sustainability has taken a back seat. The fact that most developing countries were opposed to, and most of them still are, to any multilateral agreement that would have binding GHG emission commitments on developing countries on the basis that such commitments would slow down their economic growth proves this point (Gunawansa and Kua, 2009 ).
If developing countries are to choose between traditional investment projects and CDM projects, chances are high that traditional projects would be picked. Therefore, it could be said that the existing investment policies in developing countries may sometimes act as a hindrance to promoting CDM projects. Thus, even if CDM projects would have the added benefits such as environmental sustainability and technology transfer, preference may be given to traditional investment projects if they are likely to bring higher economic benefits to developing countries.
Technology Transfer under CDM and Protection on Intellectual Property
IPRs are legal property rights over creations of the mind, both artistic and commercial, and the corresponding fields of law (Raysman et al, 1999) . The rights relating to IP can also be defined as governmental protection of private innovations and creativity (Su, 2000) . In the context of technology transfer, consideration of issues relating to IPR is important as the extent of recognition and protection of such rights might impact on their transferability across borders.
From an economic perspective, IPRs enable entrepreneurs to cover research and development expenses and ensure some profit from the use of the protected idea or invention returns to the innovator. In other words, the key economic justification for granting IPR is that it furnishes incentives for research, innovation, and creation of work.
IPR Protection Regimes
The first international treaties dealing with IPR were the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886. The Paris Convention was created to ensure protection of industrial property and dealt with the protection of patents, utility models, trademarks, and industrial designs. It required the member countries to provide equal treatment to both domestic and foreign patent holders and applicants. The Berne Convention dealt with the subject matter of copyright, which is the protection of literary, scientific, and artistic works. This too required equal protection for domestic and foreign copyright holders by the member countries. The Berne Convention described the minimum standards of protection that should be provided to copyright holders. Such standard was not provided in the Paris Convention. 
Weaknesses of IPR Protection Regime
One of the main difficulties concerning international technology transfer is that multilateral as well as regional and bilateral treaties may have imposed various conditions relating to such transfers and the related IPRs. For example Annex 1C to the multilateral agreement establishing the WTO, the Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) sets down minimum standards that should be met by national laws for many forms of IPR regulation, including copyright; geographical indications; industrial designs; integrated circuit layout-designs; patents and trademarks and confidential and undisclosed information. Further, it also specifies the enforcement procedures, remedies and dispute resolution procedures. Non-observance of the standards specified by TRIPS by developing countries might discourage developed countries from investing in such countries and transferring technology to them. This may be a factor that had contributed to only a few developing countries benefitting from CDM project investments.
It should be pointed out that although international law recognizes the right of a country to take legislative measures to provide for the granting of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses that might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by patents, various multilateral and regional agreements seek to limit this right. For example, in certain circumstances where existing patents may affect ability to comply with domestic regulations, Section 308 of the United States (US) Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA) permits compulsory licensing, if the Attorney General identifies that a patented technology is needed by others to comply and there are not reasonable alternatives. In such circumstances, the US Courts are authorized to order licensing, "on such reasonable terms and conditions as the courts, after hearing, may determine." While the Paris Convention and WTO through TRIPS deal with the subject broadly, NAFTA and OECD's proposal for a Multinational Agreement on Investments (MAI) severely restrict the use of compulsory licensing of patents (IPCC, 2000) . For example, NAFTA imposes certain limits on the ability of the United States to force patent owners to grant licenses under their patents. In particular, Section 104(b) of the North American Free Trade Implementation Act of US requires the US Environmental Protection Agency to issue a regulation conforming CAA section 308 with the mandatory patent licensing restrictions found in NAFTA article 1709(10). However, according to a survey conducted in 1999, a number of countries both among the Annex I and non-Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol have legislations listing the circumstances under which provisions for compulsory licensing could be invoked (Health Care and IP, 1999) .
In the circumstances, it could be said that although CDM aims to contribute to sustainable development of developing countries by enabling them to inter alia benefit from transfer of technology, the current IPR regimes might act as a hindrance to some developing countries attracting CDM investments. Thus a strong IPR protection regime should offer the following benefits: an increase in innovation due to the incentive and reward that IPRs provide; fair treatment of innovators who can own the creative "sweat of the brow" and exert influence over how their technology is used; public disclosures of patented technologies, sharing of secrets under confidentiality agreements; ease of purchase, sale, or license; and enhanced investment due to the assurance that investors can recapture their investment in a technology subject to such protection (IPCC, 2000) . Thus, the reforms that should be undertaken of the IPR systems in general and in developing countries in specific should proceed based on a holistic approach, in a manner consistent with international obligations, whilst taking into account the state of domestic institutions and innovative capacities as well as the state of the IPR system and the receptive capacity of developing countries.
This need has been recognized in the "Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO" which was signed by hundreds of nonprofits, scientists, academics and other individuals prior to the 2004 General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization, which inter alia calls on WIPO to focus more on the needs of developing countries. The declaration specifically calls that WIPO technical assistance programs must be fundamentally reformed and that developing countries must have the tools to implement the WTO Doha Declaration on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Public Health. It provides further that WIPO must help developing countries address the limitations and exceptions in patent and copyright laws that are essential for fairness, development and innovation. If the WIPO Secretariat cannot understand the concerns and represent the interests of the poor, the entire technical assistance program should be moved to an independent body that is accountable to developing countries 3 .
The recent initiatives by WIPO seem to be on the correct track. For example, the 45 recommendations adopted by the WIPO Member States at the 2007 General Assembly of the 111 original proposals made by the Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, recognizes the importance of providing technical assistance that should be development-oriented, demanddriven and transparent, taking into account the priorities and the special needs of developing countries, especially least developed countries, as well as the different levels of development of WIPO Member States 4 . Another recommendation is that Member States, especially developed countries, should be encouraged to urge their research and scientific institutions to enhance cooperation and exchange with research and development institutions in developing countries, especially LDCs 5 , supports the view expressed earlier that legal and policy developments to support IPR should be complemented by other factors.
However, although in theory a strong IPR system should promote investment, in the case of certain technologies it is not enough to have such a system in place. This is because there is a need for the planning of technological development and better identification of technological needs. Furthermore, all countries do not necessarily need cutting edge technology to satisfy specific needs, particularly with respect to clean technologies (IPCC, 2000) . According to the World Bank (1998), sometimes, stronger IPR systems can impede technology development and transfer as such regimes might adversely affect follow-on innovations and actually slow down the pace of technological development and diffusion. Thus, it is important that countries create an appropriate balance between providing protection for IPR and preventing the adverse impacts on the development of new technology.
Capacity to Receive and Benefit from Technology Transfer
Certain characteristics of the host country might also sometimes make technology transfer under CDM projects difficult. For example, whilst certain developing countries may be more technologically affluent than others having the suitable expertise that could help the developing country concerned to benefit from the transfer of technology under a CDM project, some other developing countries may not have such capacity. This concern was also discussed by Kua and Ashford (2004) and in Kua (2007) . The following figure which shows the distribution of CDM projects across the developing countries as of 2007 clearly establishes that not all developing countries in the world have benefitted from CDM projects. While these investments may result in the desired emission reductions, this asymmetrical distribution of CDM projects implies that the implementation of any form of technology transfer under the current CDM does not benefit some of the world's poorest countries that are most in need of these technology transfer (especially those in Africa), the current distribution of CDM projects clearly evidencing investor preference for developing countries with large markets with clear signs of economic and industrial progress.
Interest in Self Financing CDM projects
The Kyoto Protocol's language does not restrict the development and implementation of CDM projects to Annex I countries or approved parties from them. In the circumstances, a developing country may be free to design and implement a CDM project on its own for the purpose of exporting the certified emissions reductions, provided that the project satisfies the CDM requirements of certification, auditing and verification.
If unilateral CDM projects are allowed, it might create additional incentives for developing governments to limit or bar foreign investors from CDM projects. To promote an endogenous, climate-friendly technology in a particular sector, a host country might decide to keep these sectors domestic; at least until the domestic investment sector was prepared to compete with foreign rivals. However, in such a case, the host country could accord CDM projects developed in their jurisdictions by foreign entities treatment less favorable than that accorded projects developed by local investors. This might adversely affect the willingness of developing countries to attract CDM projects and benefit from modern technology that may be used in CDM project and transferred to developing countries by developers from developed countries (Werksman et. al.; 2001) . Kua and Ashford (2004) pointed out that the capacity for host countries to benefit from technology transfer can often be affected by the opportunities, incentives and willingness to adopt these new technologies. In other words, for example, in the absence of attractive incentives to accept technology transfer from foreign entities, a country will be unwilling to open its door to these foreign technologies even if an opportunity exists.
Lack of Host Country Interest
Traditionally infrastructure needs in countries have been financed both by internal and external resources. Internally, the financial needs to develop infrastructure was accomplished through the equity provided by the central or the local governments, with any insufficiency of such internal funds being usually supplemented by direct borrowing.
The external sources of funding for major infrastructure development needs have been primarily Multilateral Development Banks and Bilateral Aid Agencies. However, with demand for financial support, better and increased utility services and infrastructure facilities growing, the ability of the traditional sources of finance to support development needs have proven to be inadequate (World Bank, 2002) . Thus, private sector has been able to make inroads into developing and managing sectors which were not traditionally open to them (Gunawansa, 2005) . For example, although historically the financing of physical infrastructure projects in developing countries relied heavily on public finance, in the 1990s, private participation in infrastructure took off from $18.1 billion in 1990 to a peak of $127 billion in 1997 (Noel and Brezeski, 2005) .
Thus, in the modern systems of government, public sector in most countries does not play an active role in developing physical infrastructure facilities and utility service providers, although they are active in the area of policymaking and regulating. The public sector ownership and control of utility sector has drastically reduced with the private sector getting actively engaged in the provision of such services. This could pose a problem when it comes to generating an interest in the private sector to participate in projects such as those developed under the CDM as, at the outset, such projects may not be considered profitable, and thus favorably, by the local private sector entities. The key reasons for such lack of interest will be the initial high investment cost needed for environmentally friendly technologies and the availability of cheaper technology options locally. Further, the lack of experience in engaging with the investors from Annex 1 countries and meeting the strict qualifying requirements for CDM such as the additionality requirement might discourage local private sector participation.
The Way Forward
Despite the various impediments the relevant stakeholders might face in developing CDM projects and benefitting from them, CDM has the potential to be a successful mechanism for dealing with climate change mitigation. Clearly, a host country can influence the extent of technology transfer involved in its CDM projects, as each CDM project must be approved by the host country government. Thus, if as part of its approval process the host country government chooses to impose technology transfer requirements, then that would enable them to benefit from environmentally sustainable new technologies coming from developed countries. For example, in the Eligibility Criteria for CDM project approval established by the Indian Government, it is prescribed that the "(f)ollowing aspects should be considered while designing [a] CDM project activity: … 4. Technological well being: The CDM project activity should lead to transfer of environmentally safe and sound technologies that are comparable to best practices in order to assist in upgrading of the technological base. The transfer of technology can be within the country as well from other developing countries also". Likewise, the Korean Designated National Authority for the CDM requires that "environmentally sound technologies and know how shall be transferred".
If the developed countries or developers from developed countries could negotiate the required protection and include them in the relevant project development agreements, then that would address their fears in transferring technologies to developing countries to some extent. The introduction of a standard project development agreement with necessary protection of IPR within the Kyoto framework and the appropriate regulatory mechanism within the same framework could also facilitate transfer of technology under CDM projects as such initiatives could ensure that contracting parties honor their commitments.
Further, active encouragement by the public sector entities in non-Annex 1 countries is needed for CDM projects to take root in their jurisdictions. Such encouragement should go beyond consideration of policy options and introduction of legislative and regulatory frameworks to facilitate CDM projects. The public sector entities could also act as intermediaries in creating incentives and facilitating a market for CDM projects. This can be done by providing incentives for local participants to partner with foreign investors from Annex 1 countries to develop CDM projects. Such incentives could come in the form of tax incentives and financial assistance. In addition, the public sector entities could also consider entering into public-private partnerships with private sector entities in developing CDM projects. Furthermore, research and development of sectors that could attract investment under the CDM mechanism is something the public sector entities could engage in.
For example, in India, The Energy Management Centre (EMC), an autonomous agency, under the Ministry of Power of the Government of India has been very active as a technology intermediary for energy efficiency. EMC has been carrying out a number of initiatives to promote energy conservation and efficiency in India. It has set up and trained approximately 25 agencies (public, private, and NGOs) to provide specialized energy auditing and management to consumers in India (IPCC, 2000) . It is said that each of these agencies carry out on an average 10-12 energy audits annually and the feedback from the industry is that there is an urgent need for many more such professional agencies to be able to serve the consumers in the country. EMC has also carried out a number of studies in the area of technologies for energy efficiency, issues relating to standards and labeling, and implements a nation-wide energy conservation awareness project. To date, it is reported that over 5,000 professionals have been provided training in different aspects of energy efficiency. Regular feedback indicated that the participants have actually implemented energy efficiency projects in their organizations. EMC was the executing agency for international co-operation projects with Germany, the European Union and the Department of Energy (USA) among others (IPCC, 2000) . Another example from India is the establishment of The Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) as an autonomous organization of the Indian Department of Science and Technology. This entity has been particularly successful in making the public-private sector linkages, providing information on patent issues, and supporting start-up ventures (IPCC, 2000) .
If there is no patent in force in the country seeking to acquire technology, the main barriers to technology transfer will be: inadequate technical expertise and know-how in the country; the incapacity of the country concerned to negotiate a suitable transfer agreement; and the reluctance of the technology owner to transfer the technology. Appropriate training and education of local workforce could help overcome the first barrier. Obtaining required professional help for effective and efficient negotiations could address the second barrier. The third barrier may be overcome with financial support and other economic incentives. Such incentives could come from either the recipient country or the technology owner's country; in the latter case, such incentives could be provided in form of aid and support to a developing country from a developed country. Multilateral, regional or bilateral frameworks could facilitate such support.
Conclusion
Technology transfer is not an explicit objective of the Clean Development Mechanism, but if well structured, CDM could be a vehicle for transferring environmentally sustainable technologies from Annex 1 countries to non-Annex 1 Countries. This is the case because of the unique nature of CDM. CDM invites Annex I countries to work with non-Annex 1 countries to further sustainable development and the overall objectives of UNFCC. Such partnership between countries could be made possible by Annex 1 countries financing and developing emission reduction projects in non-Annex 1 countries using technologies currently not available in the host countries. This would assist Annex I Parties to achieve their emission reduction obligations through a transfer of earned carbon credits, whilst, the project would generate new employment and revenue to the non-Annex 1 country and also by transfer of technologies enable the later to be more environmentally sustainable. Further, the provisions for governance of the CDM are more specific than for the other two mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol also calls for independent auditing and verification of CDM project activities. This would ensure transparency and credibility in the final results, and the need for agreement on standardized procedures of performance on which to base certification.
Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol is subject to adjustments or even drastic changes after 2012. A road map for a post-Kyoto mechanism has already been agreed to after the Bali discussions in 2007, and more debate is expected in Copenhagen in 2009. The discussions on the post-Kyoto mechanism would provide a good platform for the international community to consider solutions for the current impediments that has prevented CDM from working to its true potential in the area of technology transfer.
